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Critique of Article 
he effort of the authors is laudable. The literature coverage andthe review is 
comprehensive and well documented. The paper is a valuable contribution to 
Islamic economics in that it supports the affirmative position on profit 
maximization within the juristic confines as expoundedin some earlier writings. 
Beyond that it suffers from some serious blemishes. 
The authors start with the following premise. The firm “raises capital through ex-
ante (before production and sale of output) profit-losssharing arrangement. The funds 
thus raised and the amount of capital purchased with these funds give theprice per 
unit of capital (r). Being rule compliant regarding distribution, the firm knows that 
all profits must be distributed among factor inputs, including entrepreneurial effort 
subsumed under one or the other inputs”. (emphasis added). 
To begin with, the assumption that entrepreneurial effort is subsumed under one 
or the other inputs – labor or capital – is confusing; The authors must indicate 
which of the two factors includes the entrepreneurial effort for their model. For, if 
labor contains it, one would demand the division of wL into wage and 
entrepreneurial reward. On the other hand, its inclusion in capital would require a 
bifurcation of rK into money capital cost and the return to the entrepreneur. It 
would be an uphill task to handle either divisions in a worthwhile modeling. 
     That apart, one may like to seek some clarifications on the inequalities the 
learned authors have erected on theirpremise stated above. In their formulations 
down the line, in rK, K must be the physicalunits of capital, not its money value; 
for, (average price r = funds /Assets purchased) The error also vitiates another 
claim of the authors. In their opening statement they say: “(a) Profits are exhausted 
by payments to inputs as agreed in the pre-productionphase, i.e. π =wL+ rK, The 
two component cannot be independent of the pre-agreed sharing ratio. The model 
is oblivious to this obvious imperative.Furthermore,r in the equation no longer 
remains the assets price; it becomes the rate of return on funds invested, and net 
revenueπ becomes a linear combination of payments to labor and capital In fact, rK 
is, by the authors’ own rendition, the money volume of funds. committed to 
business. If one wants to bring in, as one must, the return on rK into the picture, 
one more symbol for it, say µ, must enter the picture to rewrite the equation as π 
=wL + µrK. The use of µ could have plainly been avoided by not bringing the 
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frivolous asset price into the picture; r could have straight away been defined as the 
rate of return on money capital K.Two observations follow from this error. 
 
1. The inconsistent symbol definitionsvitiate the model building down the line as 
shown above, but the trouble does not end with mathematical faux pas. The 
model, as presented, does not fit into the logic of micro frameworkof individual 
firms. The authors raise three scenarios. Case (a),wherein π is the profit of the 
firm, is simple and raises no issues. But case (b) that brings in losses, creates 
serious difficulties. In π <wL + rK for the firm, therK part could be negative 
such that wL may even be more than wiped out – workers by implication share 
losses. Minimum wage provision guards against that possibility and cannot be 
dropped, as the authors naively suggest, from any sharing model of the sorts. 
 
2. However, the authors explicitly focus on the third case (c) i.e. π >wL + rK. But 
this looks anomalous;for, it assumes such predetermined value for π - the profit 
volume - as would make the inequality hold good. Now, in a two-factor sharing 
model, one must explain who would receive the excess profit π the inequality 
assumes, additional to what labor and capitaltogether would get? Why would 
not r appropriately go up to convert the inequality into an equation? 
 
Thus, in our humble opinion, the model the authors’ present is flawed on 
several counts and needs extensiverevision to be fruitful. As a minor point, the 
documents cited in the paper and those listed in the references lack a two-way 
matching in a notable way. 
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